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In 1999, the Korean government made a drug pricing policy
reform to improve the efficiency and transparency of the drug
distribution system. Yet, its policy formation process was far
from being rational. Facing harsh resistance from various inter-
est groups, the government changed its details into something
different from what was initially investigated and planned. So
far, little evidence supports any improvement in Korea's drug
distribution system. Instead, the new drug pricing policy has
deteriorated Korea's national health insurance budget, indi-
cating a heavier economic burden for the general public. From
Korea's experience, we may draw some lessons for the future
development of a better health care system. As a society
becomes more pluralistic, the government should come out of
authoritarianism and thoroughly prepare in advance for resis-
tance to reform, by making greater efforts to persuade strong
interest groups while informing the general public of potential
benefits of the reform. Additionally, facing developing civic
groups, the government should listen but not rely too much
on them at the final stage of the policy formation. Many of
the civic groups lack expertise to evaluate the details of policy
and tend to act in a somewhat emotional way.
Key Words: Health, reform, policy, interest group, politics,
drug price, Korea
INTRODUCTION
Korea has one of the highest levels of drug
consumption in Asia, but policies related to drug
use have not been developed accordingly. Most of
all, the drug pricing policy has long been criti-
cized due to its obscure operating methods and its
lack of flexibility. Furthermore, until recently, both
physicians and pharmacists were allowed to pre-
scribe and dispense drugs for outpatient care. It
was claimed that these underdeveloped drug-rel-
ated policies allowed the overuse and misuse of
drugs, and encouraged high pharmaceutical expen-
ditures. To allegedly improve the transparency and
efficiency of the drug distribution system, the
Korean government launched a pharmaceutical
reform. The implementation was very difficult,
drawing Korea into a vortex of social and eco-
nomic turmoil, culminating with five nation-wide
physicians' strikes.
The Korea's pharmaceutical reform consisted of
two parts. First, a drug pricing policy reform
promulgated on November 15, 1999. Second, a
drug policy reform declared on July 1, 2000 that
mandated the separation of medical institutions
and pharmacies for outpatient care (hereafter, the
mandatory separation policy). Most researchers
and policymakers thoroughly discussed the imple-
mentation of the mandatory separation policy,
1-5
but did not focus on the drug pricing policy
reform. One reason for this may be that the drug
pricing policy, rather than the mandatory separa-
tion policy, is very complicated for general readers
to understand. Secondly, the general public may
not be thought of as a primary stakeholder re-
garding the drug pricing policy reform.
Without fully understanding the drug pricing
policy reform, one cannot look into Korea's phar-
maceutical reform or the mandatory separation
policy and the resulting side effects. One reason
is because it was a precursor of the mandatory
separation policy. Another reason is due to the
interacted, dynamic reallocation of benefits among
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various interest groups such as, physicians, civic
groups, and multinational and domestic drug
companies, and not from the headstrong pursuit
of post-pharmaceutical reform benefits to physi-
cians. Therefore, this paper will deal with the
drug pricing policy reform, with particular em-
phasis on the role of interest groups.
In the health domain, some interest groups have
been extraordinarily powerful and influential par-
ticipants in the political process. They are often
very effective as either defenders or opponents of
health policy reforms. Deeply involved in the
policy formation process, they pressure the gov-
ernment to change reform details for their own
benefit.
6-8 The case of Korea's drug pricing policy
reform was no exception. Various interest groups
were involved in agenda-setting and policy for-
mation. As a result, the finalized details of the
reform were far from the government's initial
proposals, making it difficult to achieve the policy
objective of improving the transparency and effi-
ciency of Korea's drug distribution system.
This paper will investigate how the initial
proposals of Korea's drug pricing policy reform
were changed by various interest groups and
what the policy reform has really accomplished.
First, we review Korea's traditional drug pricing
policy and its structural deficiencies. Second, we
examine the drug pricing policy reform process
and details, with the main focus on the role of
various interest groups. The role of civic groups
who appear to have few economic motives but
still work for political interest will be addressed.
Finally, we review the impact of the reform on
Korean society and the health care sector.
TRADITIONAL DRUG PRICING POLICY IN
KOREA
Basic contents
The Korean government has strictly regulated
the prices of reimbursable drugs since the public
insurance system was first introduced in 1977. The
main method used to "fix" the drug price was the
"officially notified price (ONP) method", whose
regulation was under the supervision of a drug
pricing commission for the national health in-
surance system. Specifically, when a new drug
was first registered, its ONP was determined by
adding a fixed wholesale margin and value-added
tax to the ex-factory price reported by the manu-
facturing company. Once a drug was officially
registered, its price acted as a base for the ONP
of other drugs having identical constituents. The
ONP of a new drug, whose weight was different
from the registered ones, was determined by
comparing its weight with that of previously
registered and structurally similar drugs.
The ONP of a "new, innovative drug" was sub-
ject to more stringent price controls than that of
domestic, generic drugs. Its price was set to the
lowest value as determined from the following
three methods: a composite price of the ONPs
of similar constituents or of products having
similar efficacy, the average ex-factory price
prevailing in the advanced seven (A-7) countries
plus a wholesale margin and a value-added tax,
and if the drug had previously been imported,
the combined value of cargo, insurance, freight,
and a value-added tax, multiplied by 2.1.
9 As a
result, the drug prices of the multinationals' inno-
vative products in Korea were lower than in their
mother countries.
Major problems
The traditional drug pricing policy has long
suffered harsh criticism due to its structural defi-
ciencies. First, the reimbursed prices were too
rigid, often failing to reflect true economic condi-
tions. The government investigated actual transac-
tions and lowered the prices if the drugs were
sold at larger discounts than at the government-
fixed allowable level. However, their inspections
were narrowly based, restricted to several inten-
tionally or arbitrarily chosen drugs. Second, un-
derground pharmaceutical drug transactions were
encouraged under the ONP scheme. Drug com-
panies sought to sell products at the highest price
possible, while health service providers attempted
to lower prices, because the drug margin (the dif-
ference between the ONP and the actual transac-
tion price (ATP)), was their own profit. To prevent
the government from lowering reimbursed prices,
drug companies often requested buyers to issue
false transaction reports, stating that they hadKorea's Drug Pricing Policy Reform
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bought drugs within the government-fixed allow-
able level. In return, drug companies gave buyers
under-the-table benefits, such as unofficial rebates,
kickbacks, or even payment for trips abroad.
Third, initial reimbursement prices were often
incorrectly estimated, as the ONP was determined
by simply adding a wholesale margin and a
value-added tax to the ex-factory cost, without
taking into account the effects of scale and varia-
tion in the production process. Finally, the ONP
system left room for the over-prescription of
drugs in order to provide higher profits to clinics,
hospitals and pharmacies. Indeed, with the ONPs
being far higher than the actual purchase prices,
physicians and/or pharmacists were reimbursed
more than they paid, guaranteeing greater profits
if more drugs were distributed to patients.
10
IMPLICIT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT AND PHYSICIANS
Despite its weakness, the traditional drug pric-
ing policy endured in the Korean health system
for more than 20 years. Given that details of the
drug pricing policy were too complicated for the
public to understand, the government acted to
utilize the obscure and inefficient nature of the
traditional drug pricing policy in order to com-
pensate physicians for the losses they incurred
under Korea's national health insurance system.
Specifically, when Korea extended public health
insurance to the national level in 1989, the gov-
ernment fixed physician's fees at levels far below
the supply costs to reduce the cost to the patients.
According to a study of a resource-based relative
value system in Korea, the weighted average fee
for medical care covered by the national health
insurance system was only about 65 percent of the
supply costs for that care in 1997.
11 For instance,
the physician's fee for a normal spontaneous
vaginal delivery regulated by the national health
insurance system was set at about US$ 33 (equiv-
alently, 39,670 Korean Won) in 1998.
12 Although
there was no contract regarding fees and benefits
between the government and medical institutions,
even private medical institutions, contributing
about 90% of health services, had to provide
medical services at the regulated fees as the
Korean government forced all medical institutions
to join the national health insurance system. Given
the lack of public medical institutions, the govern-
ment thought that the national insurance system
could not be maintained without government
control of private medical institutions. The physi-
cians continued to request an increase in fees as
well as a contract-based participation in the na-
tional health insurance system. The government
was reluctant to accept their requests, as they ran
counter to public consensus that physicians were
already relatively wealthy and the public disbelief
that physicians were losing money.
Instead, the government implicitly compensated
for the physicians' losses by utilizing the vague-
ness of the traditional drug pricing policy. The
government implicitly allowed physicians to make
profits from the drug margins, thereby actually
subsidizing physicians with drug profits rather
than with physicians' fees. Because the drug pric-
ing mechanism was complicated and technically
difficult for the general public to understand, this
kind of cross-subsidization worked well in
soothing the physicians' concern, while blinding
the general public to the truth. This seemingly
stable, but actually fragile equilibrium between
the government and physicians had lasted for a
long time when a political change called for
drastic drug policy reform in 1998.
13 In the mean-
time, domestic drug companies remained some-
what passive between the government and physi-
cians. The fragile political equilibrium under the
traditional drug pricing policy is shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. The political equilibrium under the traditional
drug pricing policy.
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REFORM PRESSURE BY CIVIC GROUPS
The government of ex-President Kim Dae-Jung,
who came to power in February 1998, the first
so-called post-authoritarian regime in Korea, was
supported by progressive members of the labor
unions, the academia, and civic groups wanting
reforms in various areas. However, Kim's ruling
party was still in the minority in the Korean
National Assembly and it was difficult to pursue
the reforms demanded by his supporters. Accord-
ingly, Kim's administration relied on civic groups
to influence public consensus directly, rather than
through the National Assembly. Partly being in-
terpreted as a populist approach, Kim's depen-
dence on civic groups suffered criticism while
forcing many civic groups to carry a political
agenda. Many civic groups were newly created
during Kim's regime to gain his support.
14,15
Kim used a similar tactic in the pharmaceutical
reform. Interestingly, what the government ini-
tially targeted was not the drug pricing policy but
the separation of prescription and dispensing of
drugs for outpatient care. This separation had
long been scheduled for launch on July 1, 1999, as
specified in the Korean Pharmaceutical Law.
Nevertheless, it was not an easy task because each
related interest group, such as the Korea Medical
Association, Korea Pharmaceutical Association
and Korea Hospital Association, was ready to
strike against the government if the details of the
policy were not favorable to their own interests.
Worse yet, the public had no idea what the policy
meant, why it was needed, or how much it would
cost.
Accordingly, Kim's government decided to rely
on the activities of civic groups again, this time to
highlight the problems of the traditional drug
pricing policy in order to raise the public's interest
in the reform. Notably, the civic groups with
leading members in the health care reform com-
mittee of the ruling party, disclosed that physi-
cians were enjoying huge profits resulting from
the drug margins, while simultaneously incurring
excessive costs of up to about 13% of medical
treatment expenses, US$ 1.06 billion (equivalently,
1.28 trillion Korean Won), through the national
health insurance system. It was asserted that the
current drug pricing policy tempted physicians to
over-prescribe drugs for their own profit.
16
This disclosure attracted a great deal of atten-
tion from the media and general public. Shortly
afterwards, physicians were severely criticized as
having long enjoyed huge, under-the-table profits
from the drug margins, excessive prescriptions
and tax evasion at the expense of their patients'
health and financial well-being.
17 A debate arose
for the elimination of the drug margins, and a
substantial number of civic groups organized a
united civic front and staged angry demonstra-
tions and rallies calling for a radical pharmaceu-
tical reform to eliminate the drug margins.
18
INITIAL REFORM PROPOSAL
The detailed tasks for the drug pricing policy
reform included the selection of a method for
determining the launch price of a new, innovative
drug, and the development of a formula for
determining prices of all reimbursed drugs after
their launch. In the beginning, the government
planned to adopt the "purchasing power parity"
(PPP) method for pricing new, innovative drugs,
and the "aggregate ATP" (AATP) method for
pricing all reimbursable drugs after their launch.
The PPP method, recommended by the govern-
ment-funded Korea Institute for Health and Social
Affairs, is a conversion method whereby the reim-
bursement is based on the innovativeness and
cost-effectiveness of a drug, its price in other
countries, and the purchasing power of Korean
consumers.
19 The PPP method has some illogic;
for example, irrespective of the same benefit, the
method must impose a higher price on a relatively
higher income society. Nevertheless, the method
was thought of as a new approach which could
take into account the ability-to-pay, in order to
determine the price of the new, innovative drugs.
Meanwhile, the AATP method was designed to
increase the economic incentives for physicians to
buy drugs as cheaply as possible, while de-
creasing the drug margins gradually. The AATP
method was first proposed by the Health Care
Reform Committee, an advisory group for the
Korean Prime Minister,
20 and details were supple-
mented by the Korea Institute for Health and
Social Affairs and the government-funded HealthKorea's Drug Pricing Policy Reform
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Insurance Review Agency.
21 Some of the short-
comings of the AATP method were that certain
drug price differentials would remain even under
the new method, and that it was necessary to have
most of the drug distributors report their transac-
tion prices to the government for calculating the
AATP. The government had openly stated for
more than two years that it would adopt the
AATP method, shaping specific details through
public discussions and research done by various
public institutions. The Korean government was
not able to implement its plan because of the
pressure exerted by domestic and multinational
drug companies.
PROPOSAL MODIFICATION BY DRUG
COMPANIES
As discussed earlier in this paper, the tradi-
tional drug pricing policy worked against mul-
tinational drug companies' interests. Under the
traditional drug pricing policy, there was almost
no room for the multinationals to be able to raise
their drug prices to the levels they wanted. The
only possibility to increase their revenue was to
expand their sales in the Korean health sectors.
Accordingly, the multinational manufacturers of
new, innovative drugs, along with their mother
countries' trade agencies, have long searched for
an opportunity to influence Korea's drug pricing
policy. One example was to abolish the traditional
pricing method and to raise the reimbursed prices
of internationally innovative drugs to the same
price levels operating in developed countries.
Demanding that the national health insurance
system increase the extensive use of their drugs,
they often criticized Korea's traditional drug
pricing method as a highly discriminative and
effective import barrier.
Yet, such requests from multinationals went
ignored for a long time until Korea started mov-
ing more aggressively toward globalization, one
of the conditions of the International Monetary
Fund's rescue package following the 1997's cur-
rency crisis. In the background of Korea's move to
open its markets in various areas, the multina-
tionals took an important step in developing a
more effective channel of communication with the
government by establishing the Korea Research-
based Pharmaceutical Industry Association
(KRPIA) in March 1999. Previously, their main
avenue to influence the Korean government was
the Korea Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associa-
tion, but this organization consisted mainly of
domestic drug companies who were seeking to
limit the multinationals' market share in the
Korean market. The KRPIA employed, as a policy
adviser and executive vice president, an ex-senior
official of the Korea Ministry of Health and
Welfare and the Heath Insurance Review Agency.
It rapidly grew to become a major lobby group,
supported by foreign public and private interest
groups. To mold the Korean drug pricing policy
reform to fit their own interests, the KRPIA and
their supporters visited the Korean government
and frequently requested meetings for negotia-
tion.
22
Their efforts were not in vain. To select a
method to determine the launch price of new,
innovative drugs, in August 1999, the "captured"
Korean government organized an eight-member
task force consisting mainly of drug suppliers:
five members were from multinational and do-
mestic drug companies, while one was from each
of the Health Insurance Review Agency, the Korea
Institute for Health and Social Affairs, and the
government-funded Korea Consumer Protection
Board.
13 After approximately three months, the
so-called A-7 pricing method was adopted by a
majority vote (six to two),
23 and replaced the
long-discussed PPP method. It is worth noting
that the A-7 pricing method was initially pro-
posed by the KRPIA. According to this method,
the reimbursement price for a new, innovative
drug is determined by the average ex-factory price
of the product in the advanced seven (A-7) coun-
tries, plus a wholesale margin and a value-added
tax. This method raised the launch price of a new,
innovative drug in Korea to a level higher than or
equal to that of at least one of the A-7 countries.
Indeed, the A-7 pricing method was implemented
on July 1, 2000, with all previous discussion and
support for the PPP method ignored and without
any public hearing.
Meanwhile, domestic drug companies played
an important role in the government choice of
reimbursable drugs as opposed to the long-dis-Woojin Chung and Han Joong Kim
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cussed AATP method. In an internal and covert
meeting, the government surprisingly adopted the
"individual ATP" (IATP) method, instead of the
AATP method, as the main formula for pricing all
reimbursable drugs after their launch. The IATP
method was mainly supported by drug companies
and their lobby groups, the Korea Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association and the KRPIA, and
was duly implemented on November 15, 1999
without any further public discussion.
24
According to the IATP method, the drug reim-
bursement price is determined by the "individual"
ATPs employed between buyers and sellers, but
cannot be higher than a ceiling price fixed by the
government; the ceiling price itself is determined
as the average of the ATPs of the drug in the
previous period. Contrary to the AATP, the IATP
method discourages any economic incentives for
physicians to acquire drugs at cheaper prices,
whereas drug companies and wholesalers seek to
sell drugs at the highest possible prices, namely,
the ceiling prices. Therefore, almost no possibility
exists for a drug price to drop below its launch
price, initially determined as its ceiling price.
Because the drug price tends to stay at its launch
price, drug companies strive to set the launch
prices as high as possible. Despite this inherent
weakness in the method, drug companies and
their lobby groups were successful in convincing
the government and civic groups that the IATP
method could eliminate the problem of the drug
margins, as physicians were reimbursed for what
they had paid for the product, creating more
honest and transparent pharmaceutical drug
transactions. Meanwhile, domestic drug com-
panies remained somewhat passive between the
government and physicians. Fig. 2 summarizes
the political dynamics which triggered the drug
pricing policy reform.
DISCUSSION: IMPACT OF THE REFORM
Who was the major winner or loser of the new
drug pricing policy? Based on the available data
and anecdotal evidence, we will discuss the
impact of the reform on physicians, drug com-
panies and the national health insurance, in-
cluding consumers.
Physicians
The discussion of the new drug pricing policy
was primarily led by the drug companies, civic
groups and the government, with the physicians
being largely isolated. Accordingly, physicians'
interests were completely ignored in the policy.
Indeed, the new drug pricing method, which offi-
cially eliminates the drug margins, removed the
opportunity for physicians to have their losses
subsidized. On top of this, the government
planned to implement a radical type of mandatory
separation reform, that is, a separation of medical
institutions and pharmacies for outpatient care, as
opposed to a separation of the prescription and
dispensing of drugs for outpatient care. All health
care institutions were legally restricted from em-
ploying pharmacists for outpatients and from
locating pharmacies within their buildings or
business perimeters. This implied that most health
care institutions would have to incur sustainable
financial losses unless physicians' medical service
fees were raised.
In February 2000, just after the drug pricing
policy reform and the passage of the mandatory
separation reform in the Korea's National As-
sembly, physicians began opposition to the gov-
ernment on a large scale, with about 40,000 phy-
sicians demonstrating against the government.
Subsequently, physicians again went on strike in
the periods April 4-6, June 20-26, August 11-17,
Organized
medicine
Government
Foreign
trade
agencies
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Civic groups
Multinationals
Strategic alliance
Direction of pressure
Fig. 2. The political dynamics which triggered the drug
pricing policy reform.Korea's Drug Pricing Policy Reform
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and October 6-10, 2000. During the second strike,
more than 90% of clinics participated. Even the
interns and residents who provide a considerable
proportion of the medical services at teaching
hospitals went on strike for more than four
months. The entire health care system of Korea
was severely disrupted for about 10 months,
which drew Korea into a vortex of social and
political turmoil. Pressured by complaints from
the general public and the physicians' anger, the
government modified the reform details to ex-
clude injectable drugs from the mandatory separa-
tion and raised the physicians' fees five times, to
a total increase of 44% of the pre-reform level.
25
The fee raise may be interpreted as a process of
compensation for the asserted low level of physi-
cians' fees.
Drug companies
Inasmuch as drug companies were deeply
involved in the drug pricing policy reform, they
benefited greatly from the new policy, particularly
the multinational producers of new, innovative
drugs. The A-7 pricing method allowed the multi-
nationals to raise the prices of their new, inno-
vative drugs to the average prices of the A-7
countries, allowing drug prices to be higher than
those in some A-7 countries, whose per capital
GDP is more than twice that of Korea. A study
by the Korea Institute for Health and Social
Affairs calculated the PPP-converted, weighted
average price of new, innovative drugs. Notwith-
standing its lack of methodological perfection, the
study estimated the price index for new, innova-
tive drugs in Korea as 145.6, compared to 100 in
France, and being much higher than that of the
UK and Japan (Table 1).
26
In addition, the mandatory separation reform,
which was implemented in July 2000, worked in
favor of the multinationals by boosting the
utilization of the new, innovative drugs that they
produced. The market share of the multinationals
increased sharply, doubling in only one year to
22.7% in 2000, from 9.6% in 1999. Consequently,
drug imports rose an impressive 58.3%, to US
$1,554 million in 2000, up from US $982 million
in 1999 (Fig. 3).
27-29
National health insurance and consumers
The new drug policy appears to have worked
against the national health insurance budget in
several ways.
First, the new drug pricing policy eliminated
any economic incentives to report ATPs in the
drug distribution process, thus sharply increasing
government reimbursement prices. Indeed, the
introduction of the IATP method eventually
pushed the ATPs up to the ceiling prices, a
situation which is reflected in the official data,
which reported the average ATP of all reimburs-
able drugs to be as high as 99.2% of the average
ceiling price.
30
Second, the rising utilization of new, innovative
drugs deteriorated the financial condition of the
national health insurance budget. Patients, who
are now able to compare prescriptions dispensed
at various health care sources after the mandatory
separation, often ask their physicians to replace
generic drugs with new, high grade, innovative
Table 1. Average Prices for New, Innovative Drugs in 2000
1
France UK Japan Korea Italy Switzerland Germany USA
100.0 117.9 132.0 145.6 146.9 150.8 233.3 306.0
1The number represents the price indices of each country converted by purchasing power parity, assuming that the price in France
is 100.
26
Fig. 3. Drug import and export in Korea, 1996-2000.
27Woojin Chung and Han Joong Kim
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drugs which are used at tertiary care institutions.
Physicians no longer have any incentive to pre-
scribe cheaper drugs to patients. Accordingly,
drug spending per insurance claim for outpatient
care soared sharply, rising 127.3% in 2000 and
80.2% in 2001 (Fig. 4).
31
Third, the increase in average physician service
fee hurt the national health insurance budget.
Overall, with the pharmaceutical reform firmly in
place in 2001, reimbursement by the national
health insurance system surged by 32.2% in just
one year.
32 This resulted in a huge, unprecedented
deficit in the national health insurance budget,
raising concerns that the system might face a
serious budget crisis in the near future (Table 2).
33
All of these costs could be acceptable as long as
the drug pricing policy reform achieves its main
policy goal of improving the transparency and
efficiency of the drug distribution system. Unfor-
tunately, there is little evidence that the new
pricing policy has achieved its objectives. It was
discovered that drug producers illegally kept
wholesalers from offering cheaper prices to
buyers, thereby maintaining the ATPs at their ceil-
ing levels. In addition, while the drug companies
supplied wholesalers with drugs at discounts
ranging from 5-85% off the ceiling prices, whole-
salers allegedly reported false transaction docu-
ments purporting that they still sold the drugs at
ceiling prices to medical institutions and phar-
macists.
26 The forging of documents was, and still
remains, common for drug transactions in Korea.
34
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The main objective of the Korean drug pricing
reform in 1999 was to improve the efficiency and
transparency of the drug distribution system.
Motivated by long-standing criticism about its
traditional drug policies, the reform itself was a
move in the right direction. Yet, its policy forma-
tion process was far from being rational. Facing
various interest groups involved in the reform
process, the Korean government changed its
details into something different from what was
initially investigated and planned. For example,
the selection of the IATP method instead of the
AATP method eliminated the economic incentives
for physicians to buy drugs at cheaper prices. This
was very unusual for countries that operate
national health insurance systems and naturally
strive to minimize the fiscal costs of reimburse-
ment. Moreover, adoption of the A-7 pricing
method, based on the average drug prices in the
advanced seven countries, ignored country-spe-
cific factors such as the potential demand, income
level, or purchasing power of the country. In most
countries, the pricing of new, innovative drugs
goes though a case-by-case negotiation process
between drug companies and private or public
insurers, along with a detailed analysis of the
cost-effectiveness of the drugs.
35,36
So far, the reform outcome leaves much to be
desired. Little evidence has supported any im-
Fig. 4. Changes in drug spending per insurance claim for
outpatient care in Korea's national health insurance,
1996-2001.
31
Table 2. Changes in the Korea’s National Health Insurance Budget, 1997-2001
31 Billion Korean Won
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Expenditure 7,795 8,788 9,610 10,674 14,108
(Increase rate, %) (20.6) (12.7) (9.4) (11.1) (32.2)
Revenue 7,554 8,230 8,892 9,757 11,789
Current balance 241 558 718 917 2,319Korea's Drug Pricing Policy Reform
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provement in the efficiency and transparency of
Korea's drug distribution system. The prevailing
drug pricing policy reform with differences
between reported and actual prices still exists.
Meanwhile, the new drug pricing policy has
deteriorated Korea's national health insurance
budget, indicating a heavier economic burden for
the general public.
From Korea's experience of the drug pricing
policy reform, we may draw policy lessons for the
future development of a better health care system.
As a society gets more pluralistic, the govern-
ment should come out of authoritarianism and
prepare thoroughly for resistance to reform in
advance, by making greater efforts to persuade
interest groups while informing the general public
of the potential benefits of the reform. In Korea,
the government did not develop any mid-term
strategies for reform, and instead changed policy
details whenever it faced harsh resistance from
various interest groups. Additionally, the govern-
ment should listen to civic groups but not rely
extensively on them at the final stage of the policy
formation. In Korea, amidst a lack of political
support, the government mobilized civic groups
to influence public opinion. However, many of the
civic groups were not familiar with the details of
the drug pricing policy and lacked expertise to
evaluate the policy implications of the various
interest groups' demands. To make matters worse,
they acted somewhat emotionally. In order to
eliminate the physicians' profits from the tradi-
tional drug pricing method, the civic groups
blamed physicians as a selfish and rich group, yet
they failed to consider the loss of the traditionally
low service fees.
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